Dana Kay Nelkin

Professor of Philosophy

Selected Articles by Area (page in progress)

Moral Responsibility and Free Will

“Two Standpoints and the Belief in Freedom,”
Journal of Philosophy 97 (2000).
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“The Consequence Argument and the Mind Argument”
Analysis 61 (2001).
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“The Sense of Freedom”
Freedom and Determinism (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004).
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“Irrelevant Alternatives and Frankfurt Counterfactuals”
Philosophical Studies 121 (2004).
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“Deliberative Alternatives”
Philosophical Topics
32 (2004).
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“Responsibility and Rational Abilities: Defending an Asymmetrical View,”
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (2008).
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“Responsibility, Rational Abilities, and Two Kinds of Fairness Arguments,”
Philosophical Explorations (2009).
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“Fairness and the Architecture of Responsibility” (with David O. Brink)
Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility (2013).
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“Desert, Fairness, and Resentment”
Philosophical Explorations
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“Moral Responsibility, the Reactive Attitudes, and the Significance of (Libertarian) Free Will”
Libertarian Free Will: Essays for Robert Kane
(Oxford University Press, 2014).
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“Difficulty and Degrees of Moral Praiseworthiness and Blameworthiness,”
Noûs (in press/published online early view 2014).
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“Friendship, Freedom, and Special Obligations”
Agency and Responsibility (Palgrave MacMillan, 2015).
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“Accountability and Desert”
The Journal of Ethics (special issue on Responsibility) (2016).
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“Moral Responsibility for Unwitting Omissions: A New Tracing Account” (with Samuel C. Rickless)
The Ethics and Law of Omissions (Oxford University Press 2017).
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Moral Responsibility and Cases

“Psychopaths, Incorrigible Racists, and Faces of Responsibility,”
Ethics (2015).
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“Fine Cuts of Moral Agency: Dissociable deficits in Psychopathy and Autism”
Current Controversies in Bioethics (Routledge 2016).
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“Frontotemporal Dementia and the Reactive Attitudes: Two Roles for the Capacity to Care?”
Journal of Applied Philosophy (2019).
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Moral Theory

“Three Cheers for Double Effect” (with Samuel C. Rickless)
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2014).
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“So Close, Yet So Far: Why Solutions to the Closeness Problem for the Doctrine of Double Effect Fall Short” (with Samuel C. Rickless)
Noûs (2015).
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Philosophy of Law

“The Relevance of Intention to Criminal Wrongdoing” (with Samuel C. Rickless)
Criminal Law and Philosophy (in press/published online 2014).
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Epistemic Rationality and Self-Deception

“The Lottery Paradox, Knowledge, and Rationality”
The Philosophical Review 109 (2000).
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“Self-Deception, Motivation, and the Desire to Believe”
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83 (2002).
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“Self-Deception and Responsibility: A Framework”
Humana Mente (2012).
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Moral Psychology and Moral Judgments

“Freedom, Responsibility, and the Challenge of Situationism”
Free Will and Moral Responsibility, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (2005).
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“Do We Have a Coherent Set of Intuitions about Moral Responsibility?”
Philosophy and the Empirical, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (2007).
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“Intuitive Probabilities and the Limitation of Moral Imagination” (with Arseny Ryazanov, Jonathan Knutzen, Samuel C. Rickless, and Nicholas J.S. Christenfeld)
Cognitive Science (2018).
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Moral Luck

“Moral Luck”
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2004 Edition) [Revised 2019 Fall Edition].

Forgiveness and Blame

“Freedom and Forgiveness”
Free Will and Moral Responsibility (Cambridge Scholars Press, 2013).
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The Routledge Encyclopedia of Free Will (2016).
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