Dana Kay Nelkin

Professor of Philosophy



Making Sense of Freedom and Moral Responsiblity 
(Oxford University Press 2011).


“Accountability and Desert”
The Journal of Ethics (special issue on Responsibility) (forthcoming).
(show abstract | paper)

“Friendship, Freedom, and Special Obligations”
Agency and Responsibility (Palgrave MacMillan, 2015).
(show abstract | paper)

“Fine Cuts of Moral Agency: Dissociable deficits in Psychopathy and Autism”
Current Controversies in Bioethics (Routledge, in press).
(show abstract | paper)

"Free Will Skepticism and Obligation Skepticism: Comments on Derk Pereboom’s Free Will Skepticism, Agency, and Meaning in Life"
Science, Religion, Culture 1 (2014).

“Difficulty and Degrees of Moral Praiseworthiness and Blameworthiness,”
Noûs (in press/published online early view 2014).
(show abstract | paper)

“Psychopaths, Incorrigible Racists, and Faces of Responsibility,”
Ethics (2015).
(show abstract | paper)

“The Relevance of Intention to Criminal Wrongdoing” (with Samuel C. Rickless)
Criminal Law and Philosophy (in press/published online 2014).
(show abstract | paper)

“Moral Responsibility, the Reactive Attitudes, and the Significance of (Libertarian) Free Will”
Libertarian Free Will: Essays for Robert Kane
(Oxford University Press, 2014).
(show abstract | paper)

“So Close, Yet So Far: Why Solutions to the Closeness Problem for the Doctrine of Double Effect Fall Short” (with Samuel C. Rickless)
Noûs (2015).
(show abstract | paper)

“Three Cheers for Double Effect” (with Samuel C. Rickless)
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2014).
(show abstract | paper)

“Freedom and Forgiveness”
Free Will and Moral Responsibility (Cambridge Scholars Press, 2013).
(show abstract | paper)

“Responsibility, Conversation, and Desert: Comments on Michael McKenna’s Conversation and Responsibility”
Philosophical Studies (2013).

“Desert, Fairness, and Resentment”
Philosophical Explorations
(show abstract | paper)

“Fairness and the Architecture of Responsibility” (with David O. Brink)
Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility (2013).
(show abstract | paper)

“Précis” and “Replies to Critics on Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research [Critics: Randolph Clarke, Laura Ekstrom, and Gary Watson] (2013).
(show précis | paper)

“Replies to Critics on Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility
Philosophical Studies [Critics: Michael McKenna and Daniel Speak] (2013).

“Immediate and Delayed Cardiovascular Effects of Forgiving,” (with Britta Larsen (first author), Ryan Darby, Christine Harris, Per-Erik Milam, and Nicholas Christenfeld (last author))
Psychosomatic Medicine (2012).

“Self-Deception and Responsibility: A Framework”
Humana Mente (2012).
(show abstract | paper)

“Responsibility, Rational Abilities, and Two Kinds of Fairness Arguments,”
Philosophical Explorations (2009).
(show abstract | paper)

“Responsibility and Rational Abilities: Defending an Asymmetrical View,”
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (2008).
(show abstract | paper)

“Do We Have a Coherent Set of Intuitions about Moral Responsibility?”
Philosophy and the Empirical, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (2007).
(show abstract | paper)

“Good Luck to Libertarians: Reflections on Mele’s Luck and Free Will”
Philosophical Explorations 10 (2007).

“Discriminating Shoppers Beware”
San Diego Law Review 43 (2006).

“Tradition and the Law: A Response to Wax”
San Diego Law Review 42 (2005).

“Freedom, Responsibility, and the Challenge of Situationism”
Free Will and Moral Responsibility, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (2005).
(show abstract | paper)

“Deliberative Alternatives”
Philosophical Topics
32 (2004).
(show abstract | paper)

“Irrelevant Alternatives and Frankfurt Counterfactuals”
Philosophical Studies 121 (2004).
(show abstract | paper)

“The Sense of Freedom”
Freedom and Determinism (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004).
(show abstract | paper)

“Moral Luck”
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2004 Edition) [Revised 2013 Summer Edition].

“Self-Deception, Motivation, and the Desire to Believe”
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83 (2002).
(show abstract | paper)

“Warfield’s New Argument for Incompatibilism” (with Samuel C. Rickless),
Analysis (2002).

“Phenomenal Consciousness and Intentionality: Comment on Charles Siewert’s The Significance of Consciousness”
Psyche: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research on Consciousness (2001).

“The Consequence Argument and the Mind Argument”
Analysis 61 (2001).
(show abstract | paper)

“How to Solve Blum’s Paradox” (with Samuel C. Rickless),
Analysis 61 (2001). (paper)

“The Lottery Paradox, Knowledge, and Rationality”
The Philosophical Review 109 (2000).
(show abstract | paper)

“Two Standpoints and the Belief in Freedom,”
Journal of Philosophy 97 (2000).
(show abstract | paper)

Book Reviews

Randolph Clarke, Omissions: Agency, Metaphysics, and Responsibility (with Samuel C. Rickless)
Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (2015).

T. M. Scanlon, Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, and Blame
The Philosophical Review (2011).

George Sher, Who Knew? Responsibility Without Awareness
Ethics 121 (2011).

Other Reviews and Interviews

“Interview on Free Will and Moral Responsibility”
Methode 2014.

“Freedom Fighters” (Review of The Adjustment Bureau) (with Samuel C. Rickless)
The Philosopher’s Magazine 54 (2011).